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Abstract
In addition to the stabilization of inflation and output gap, the responsibility of
preventing financial crises and providing stable financial system is assumed by the
central banks. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the policymakers gave finan-
cial stability mandate more prominence to preemptively obliterate the fluctuations
in the financial market. New models with alternative policy tools have emerged dur-
ing this period to analyze the impact of financial shocks, and their linkages with the
real economy. However, for the policymaker, it might not be possible to verify these
models with existing information, which leads to uncertainty. This paper proposes
robust optimal policy under uncertainty in response to financial and inflation shocks
by acknowledging financial stability as an explicit objective of monetary policy. To
do so, we extend the framework of De Paoli and Paustian (2017) by introducing
model misspecification. We show that model ambiguity in the financial side requires
a passive monetary policy stance. However, if the uncertainty originates from the
supply side of the economy, an aggressive response of interest rate is required. We
also show the contribution of an additional tool to the dynamics of the economy.
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1. Introduction
The interaction between uncertainty and financial shocks is toxic not only for
the financial sector but also for the real economy by leading to a profound welfare
reduction in the society. The most notable and acute example for this situation is the
Great Recession. After the global crisis, sustaining financial stability and preventing
financial fragility came to prominence besides inflation and output gap stabiliza-
tion. However, there is considerable uncertainty about the correct specification of
the financial markets. Furthermore, uncertainty may have profound effects on the
conduct of monetary policy, leading policymakers to purposefully deviate from cer-
tainty equivalence. Some sources of uncertainty suggest that monetary policy should
be more aggressive, while others can justify a cautious approach. Quantifying how
best to respond to economic developments under uncertainty requires knowledge of
the type and degree of uncertainty.
The literature characterizes two broad definitions of uncertainty. The first one
where decision makers assign probability distribution over possible outcomes is known
as risk. However, the second one is Knightian uncertainty in which the probability
distribution cannot be correctly specified. In the aftermath of the Great Recession,
the standard New Keynesian model has been proven to be inadequate to account
for the linkages between financial sector and the real economy. Accordingly, several
models has emerged to include the financial block. However, for the policymaker,
it might not be possible to verify these models with existing data which is relevant
to the second type of uncertainty. The type of uncertainty that we are interested is
pertinent to our aim and motivation is the latter one.
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Naturally, sound intervention to financial imbalances calls for a coherent under-
standing of the practice and the influence of the tool(s) available to the policymaker,
especially under uncertainty. Specifically, this paper aims to suggest a robust opti-
mal policy by evaluating the impact of financial shocks to the real economy under
financial uncertainty. The response of monetary policy to financial shock is exten-
sively studied by many authors such as Carlstrom et al. (2010), Fiore et al. (2011),
Huang and Davis (2013), and Angelini et al. (2014). Since responses to innovations
are triggered by uncertainty, putting shock(s) and misspecification together gives
more than the sum of the two. Kantur and O¨zcan (2018) investigate the impact of
financial uncertainty on the optimal monetary policy in which the source of financial
instability is asset price fluctuations. In this paper, while contributing to the litera-
ture by examining the impact of financial shocks under financial uncertainty with a
detailed description of the financial market and financial friction, we also extend the
analysis to focus on robust optimal policy in the presence of inflation uncertainty.
Following the above-mentioned objectives, we use the model of De Paoli and
Paustian (2017) by extending the optimal policy solution by incorporating model
uncertainty. Main intention of De Paoli and Paustian (2017) is to focus on the
strategic interaction between monetary and macroprudential authorities, while we
assume that the central bank is the only institution to conduct policy using the
available tool(s). The model utilized in this paper is a dynamic general equilibrium
model with a financial sector which is subject to moral hazard problem a la´ Gertler
and Karadi (2011). The policymaker targets the stability of inflation, output gap
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and financial markets.1 Furthermore,under full commitment we propose optimal
monetary policy when the policymaker faces model uncertainty. The model uncer-
tainty is handled by the robust control methodology to design robust policies which
performs well even under the worst case. . In this approach, the policymaker seeks
policies that can reasonably guard against catastrophic outcomes. The augmented
model of De Paoli and Paustian (2017) provides us the appropriate environment to
study the interaction between uncertainty and concomitant shocks, and to propose
necessary policy suggestions to countervail any deviation from targets which leads
to a reduction in the society’s welfare.
Our main findings are as follows: First, we show that interest rates should re-
main on hold amid financial uncertainty. Since financial uncertainty causes the pol-
icymaker to overestimate the strength of the moral hazard problem, robust central
bank guards herself against model misspecification stemming from the financial side
of the economy by initially dampening the policy rate. Consequently, model ambi-
guity in the financial side requires a passive monetary policy stance. We also show
that even under uncertainty the first best solution is achieved if the central bank
uses macroprudential tool. This result coincides with the findings of the De Paoli
and Paustian (2017) when monetary and macroprudential policymaker is in full co-
ordination and cooperation.
Second, we evaluate the impact of inflation uncertainty. Since the impact of the
1In the literature there are awash descriptions of financial stability. In a theoretical context,
the policymaker targets the volatility of the financial variable since it is considered as the source
of financial instability with the presence financial frictions. (Ueda and Valencia, 2014; Rubio and
Carrasco-Gallego, 2014; Nistico, 2016; Curdia and Woodford, 2016; Verona et al., 2017)
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supply shock is more prolonged due to uncertainty, we observe an aggressive response
in the policy rate. Moreover, as suggested by Tinbergen’s principle, the introduction
of a second tool helps to reduce the trade-off between monetary and financial stability
goals. Similar to the one-tool case, inflation uncertainty worsens the financial market
conditions. Nevertheless, macroprudential instrument suppresses the transmission of
the credit distortions into the real economy. However, interest rate response is still
aggressive since the source of uncertainty is the dynamics of inflation. Previous
studies, such as Tillmann (2009) show that monetary policy should be cautious due
to the presence of the cost channel in the determination of inflation. In contrast,
our model shows a more active policymaking. The intuition for this result is closely
linked to the specification of the spread between the policy rate and the borrowing
rate. In particular, endogenous nature of the spread in our model undermines the
impact of the cost channel. Also, our analysis implies that, as the importance of the
cost channel increases, the impact of uncertainty is proliferated in case of a supply
shock but weakened in case of a financial shock.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
the effects of financial and cost-push shocks in the presence of uncertainty and under
alternative assumptions regarding the availability of the tools of policymaker. Mean-
while, this section also provides a discussion on the significance of the cost channel.
Section 4 concludes.
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2. The Model
We adopt the model of De Paoli and Paustian (2017) as a baseline, and extend
it by introducing uncertainty to the model. The core framework is a standard New
Keynesian model with costly enforcement problem of Gertler and Karadi (2011). The
economy consists of households, firms, financial intermediaries, and the policymaker.
In this section, we describe the framework underlying the analysis in the rest of the
paper.
2.1. Household
In the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2011) —within each family—there are workers
and bankers. Within the family, the ratio of bankers to workers is constant in each
period. All family members transfer their earnings to the household, therefore there
is perfect consumption insurance. This assumption enables us to study financial
frictions in a representative agent framework.
The representative household consumes final good, ct, and provides labor, Lt,
and capital utilization services, ut, to the intermediate good producers. Households
save in terms of lending to the banks as deposits, At, and earn interest income RtAt
on their deposits at time t+ 1. Utility function of household is given by
U(ct, Lt, ut) =
c1−σt
1− σ
−
L1+θt
1 + θ
−
u1+θt
1 + θ
where σ and θ refer to degree of risk aversion and (inverse) labor supply elasticity
of the household, respectively. Real wage level is wt and rt is the price of capital
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utilization services. The period budget constraint of household in real terms is
ct + At = ΩwwtLt + Ωrrtut +
Rt−1
πt
At−1 + Tt +Πt
where πt is the inflation rate. Πt is the payment to the households from exiting
bankers. Ωw and Ωr are the steady state subsidies that are financed by the lump-
sum taxes Tt.
2
2.2. Firms
The supply side of the economy is modeled as the basic New Keynesian framework
following Clarida et al. (1999). There are two types of firms, which are intermediate
and final good producers. Different from the standard New Keynesian model, the
introduction of price stickiness is at the final good production step. Intermediate
good sector is perfectly competitive and uses labor and capital utilization services.
2.2.1. Intermediate Good Producers
Intermediate goods are produced in a perfectly competitive industry by using
labor and capital utilization supplied by the households. Production function of the
intermediate good, xt, is
xt = L
α
t u
1−α
t
2These steady state subsidies are necessary to derive welfare-based loss function. See De Paoli
and Paustian (2017) for more detailed explanation and derivation.
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where the parameter α controls the ratio of credit constrained input, that is the level
of financial friction in the production process. When α = 0, the model will collapse
to the standard New Keynesian setup without financial friction. On the other hand,
if α = 1, the sole input will be the credit-constrained labor however the distortion
originated from the resource allocation between Lt and ut disappears.
Profit function of the intermediate firms is:
profitst = ptxt −R
B
t bt − rtut
where pt is the (relative) price of the intermediate good xt at time t. To pay the
wage cost, bt = wtLt, intermediate firms have to borrow loans from banks at the rate
RBt .
2.2.2. Final Good Producers
The final goods sector is monopolistically competitive and the firms are indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1]. They produce differentiated goods by utilizing an identical technology,
and use the intermediate goods as inputs. The production function of the final good
producer is given by yi,t = xt,i. The differentiated goods are aggregated by CES
technology,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
ǫ−1
ǫ
t,i di
] ǫ
ǫ−1
where ǫ is the mark-up parameter.
Rotemberg type price stickiness is introduced with quadratic cost of price adjust-
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ment. It enters firms’ profit function i as φ
2
[(pt,i−pt−1,i)/pt−1,j]
2yt, with φ > 0. Since
the steady inflation rate is assumed to be zero, the quadratic cost disappears in the
linearized model.
2.3. Financial Intermediaries
Banks collect deposits from households at a rate Rt, and provide loans to the
intermediate good producers at a nominal interest rate, RBt . Banks receive direct
subsidy, St, from the policymaker which controls the leverage and hence the loan
supply at a given time period. Net worth of a bank j is given by
Njt = R
B
t−1Bjt−1 −Rt−1(1− St−1)Ajt−1
where Bt = Ptbt is the nominal loan value. Banks maximize their lifetime wealth:
Vjt = max
{
Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− γ)γiβiΛt,t+1+iNjt+1+i.
}
where γ is the probability of staying as a banker. This can be written recursively as
Vjt = max{Et(1− γ)Λt,t+1Njt+1 + EtγβΛt,t+1Vjt+1}
where Λt,t+1+i is the bankers’ discount rate.
Similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011), we have costly enforcement problem which
controls the capacity of banks to get loans from the households. Financial inter-
mediaries have the possibility to divert a certain fraction of assets. This generates
an endogenous market-based leverage constraint which suggests that the households
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will only provide deposits if the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) binds:
Vjt ≥ λtBjt
There may be exogenous shock ελt to the fraction λt = λε
λ
t . We suppose that the
ICC is always binding, thus the leverage is
δt =
υn,t
λt − υb,t
and a positive shock to λt reduces the leverage and tightens the credit conditions in
the economy. The incentive compatibility and in-advance borrowing constraints are
the credit frictions in the model.
2.4. System of Equations
With the optimal monetary policy the following system of equations fully char-
acterize the model:
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κ[(σ + θ)yˆt + αfˆt] + ε
m
t (1)
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 −
1
σ
(Rˆt − Etπˆt+1) (2)
nˆt = nˆt−1 + Rˆt−1 − πˆt +
1
φδ + 1
[φδδˆt−1 + δφˆt−1 + (δ − 1)Sˆt−1] (3)
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δˆt + nˆt = (1 + σ + θ)yˆt − (1− α)fˆt (4)
δˆt + εˆ
λ
t = δφˆt + (δ − 1)Sˆt + βEt[(φδ + 1)δˆt+1 + εˆ
λ
t+1] (5)
Equation (1) is the Phillips equation with exogenous cost-push shock ǫmt . Different
from the conventional New Keynesian Phillips equation, we observe financial market
related variables in the marginal cost component of the equation. Since the firms
has to borrow from banks to finance their labor cost, the effective interest rate,
ft = (Rˆt + bφˆt), appears in the Phillips relation. The parameter α controls the
significance of the cost channel on price developments. Equation (2) is the IS equation
derived from combination of Euler equation and market clearing condition. The
dynamic net worth equation is expressed in equation (3). Equation (4) illustrates
the relation between real economy and the banking sector. Finally, equation (5)
is derived from the ICC which controls the tightness of the credit conditions in
the economy. A positive exogenous shock, εˆλt , can be interpreted as tighter credit
conditions.
Shocks are assumed to follow stationary autoregressive processes:
εmt+1 = ρmε
m
t + ν
m
t+1 (6)
ελt+1 = ρλε
λ
t + ν
λ
t+1 (7)
where ρm and ρλ are the persistence of the inflation and leverage shocks, respectively.
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3. Robust Macroeconomic Policy Analysis
De Paoli and Paustian (2017) derives the model-consistent welfare criterion as
follows:
Lt =
1
2
(πˆt)
2 + χy(yˆt)
2 + χf (fˆt)
2 (8)
where χy ≡
σ+θ
ϕ
and χf ≡
α(1−α)
ϕ(1+θ)
are relative weights of the output and financial
stability.
The quadratic welfare criterion reflects the inefficiencies due to relative price
distortions, exogenous cost-push shocks, and credit frictions. In this model, the credit
spread also distorts the allocation of resources between inputs. This is because firms
require loans to finance only the labor input. This distortion assigns a fundamental
role to financial stability. Therefore, financial stability appears as an explicit target
in addition to output and inflation stabilization.
3.1. Model Uncertainty
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal behavior of the policymaker when
there is uncertainty about the structure of the economy. Model uncertainty is han-
dled by the worst-case analysis. The idea is to construct policy to hedge against
catastrophic outcomes. We focus only on commitment policies since the robust con-
trol has a significant impact on expectation formation in the economy. Therefore,
persistent shocks generate richer model dynamics.
Model uncertainty is introduced by a second type of disturbance in the mark-up
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and financial shocks:
εit+1 = ρmε
i
t + [ν
i
t+1 + w
i
t+1], i ∈ {m,λ} (9)
When equation (9) is the true shock process, the error terms in (6) and (7) are
distributed as N(wit, 1) rather than as N(0, 1).
To ensure that the distorted model is close to the reference model, the misspeci-
fication for each shock is controlled by parameters ηi0 and bounded as follows:
3
Et
∞∑
τ=0
[wit+τ ]
2 ≤ ηi0, η
i
0 > 0, i ∈ {m,λ}. (10)
3.2. Formulation of Robust Policies
To specify the policymaker’s problem with concerns about model ambiguity, we
define an evil agent. The introduction of this fictitious agent sets a ground for obtain-
ing the worst-case scenario. The evil agent maximizes the social objective function,
(8), to distort the model as much as possible. Meanwhile, the policymaker solves the
optimization problem to design an optimal policy to function well in the worst-case
scenario. Therefore, we can describe this sequence of events as a Stackelberg game
by the following max-min problem:
min
{Rˆt,Sˆt}∞t=0
max
{wi
t+1
}∞
t=0
Et
∞∑
t=t0
βt
[
Lt−β
(
Θi(wit+1))
2
)]
, i ∈ {m,λ}
3One can model same degree of model uncertainty for all types of shocks by assuming
Et
∑
∞
τ=0[w
m
t+τ + w
λ
t+1]
2 ≤ η0.
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subject to (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (9). Central bank’s uncertainty aversion is
symbolized by the parameter 0 < Θm(Θλ) <∞.4
When the policymaker has access to two instruments, the welfare maximizing
policy under credible commitment requires the joint choice of the nominal interest
rate and the macroprudential subsidy, {Rˆt, Sˆt}
∞
j=0, which minimizes the present value
of the model-consistent welfare criterion (8) subject to equilibrium conditions.
The first-order conditions for the optimal commitment policy are as follows:
πˆt + s1t − s1t−1 −
1
β
s2t−1 + s3t = 0 (11)
2χyxˆt − κ(σ + θ)s1t + σs2t −
σ
β
s2t−1 − (1 + σ + θ)s4t = 0 (12)
2χf fˆt − καs1t + s2t − βs3t+1 + (1− α)s4t = 0 (13)
−
(δ − 1)β
φδ + 1
s3t+1 − (δ − 1)s5t = 0 (14)
2χfbfˆt − καbs1t −
δβ
φδ + 1
s3t+1 + (1− α)bs4t − δs5t = 0 (15)
s3t − βs3t+1 + s4t = 0 (16)
−
φδβ
φδ + 1
s3t+1 + s4t + s5t − (φδ + 1)s5t−1 = 0 (17)
−s1t + ρms6t+1 −
1
β
s6t = 0 (18)
4Hansen and Sargent (2008) call this representation as the multiplier version of the Stackelberg
problem since Θm (Θλ) can be interpreted as a Lagrange multiplier on the entropy constraint (10).
14
−βΘwmt+1 + s6t+1 = 0 (19)
−s5t + ρλs7t+1 −
1
β
s7t = 0 (20)
−βΘwλt+1 + s7t+1 = 0 (21)
These conditions characterize robust optimal policy solution of the policymaker.
When the central bank uses the conventional tool, Rˆt, equation (14) is replaced by
the identity Sˆt = 0, meaning that credit subsidy remains at its steady state value.
In the next section, we analyze the implications of these first-order conditions under
different sources of model misspecification and shocks considering alternative tools.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Calibration and Results
The calibration of the model follows De Paoli and Paustian (2017). We set the
discount factor, β to 0.99. The elasticity of substitution between the differentiated
goods, ǫ, is calibrated to 10. The Rotemberg price adjustment cost, ϕ, is set to
211 —suggesting that prices stay fixed for an average of four quarters. The labor
share, α —or the share of intermediate goods that are credit constrained—is 0.5. We
suppose that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is θ = 0.47. We set the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, σ, to 1. Steady state levels for the leverage and credit
spread are δ = 9 and φ = 2% respectively. Shocks follow an AR(1) process for
autoregressive coefficient 0.9.
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We get three possible equilibria in this framework: (i) rational expectations, (ii)
worst-case and (iii) approximating. Rational expectations equilibrium is the base-
line outcome when the policymaker has no uncertainty aversion and the model is
not distorted. Worst-case equilibrium is the outcome in which the policymaker has
uncertainty aversion and the policy is set under the distorted model. Finally, approx-
imating equilibrium arises when the policmaker’s uncertainty aversion still exists, so
that the robust policy is conducted. However, the distortion is not realized. The
shock process dynamics is similar under the rational expectations and the approxi-
mating equilibrium; however, their policy functions are different. In this setting, the
approximating equilibrium is derived using the worst-case outcome. The policy is
tailored to insure against the catastrophic outcomes.
The degree of uncertainty aversion is quantified with error detection probability
(EDP). An EDP is the probability that the reference model and the worst-case model
are statistically indistinguishable. We set Θλ to 0.008; Θm to 163.5 and 82 for the
one-tool and two-tools cases respectively, which corresponds to a detection error
probability of 20% in a sample of 142 observations.5
This section provides a comparison of the dynamics under model uncertainty.
We have two sources of uncertainty originating from financial shock and the supply
shock. In what follows, we study the optimal commitment macroeconomic policy
under different assumptions for the availability of the monetary and macroprudential
5See Hansen and Sargent (2008) for the discussion of detection error probabilities. According to
Hansen and Sargent (2008), a reasonable detection error probability should be between the range
10% and 20%. To calculate detection error probabilities, we use the algorithm provided by Giordani
and So¨derlind (2004). Our results are robust for different values of Θi, i ∈ (λ,m).
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instruments: Rˆt and Sˆt.
4.1.1. Financial Uncertainty
Figure 1: One Tool: Responses to Financial Shock
Figure 1 illustrates the responses to financial disturbances. A positive shock to the
incentive-compatibility constraint leads to an increase in the gain from bankruptcy.
Since the value of the bank, Vt, must be equal to this gain, the incentive constraint
is tightened. Due to this effect, financial intermediaries begin a deleveraging process
by cutting down loan supply, which leads to an increase in the cost of borrowing for
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the firms, fˆt, to finance their labor input. The presence of the cost channel results
in an increase in the marginal cost and hence in inflation. The macroprudential tool
would have prevented deleveraging process by decreasing credit subsidy, Sˆt. In this
case the shock will not be transmitted to the real economy and the macroeconomic
targets will not deviate from their steady states. To counteract the fluctuations in
the inflation, without a macroprudential instrument, central bank raises policy rate,
Rˆt. Output gap deteriorates.
Under financial uncertainty, policymaker overestimates the strength of the moral
hazard problem. Because of the amplified moral hazard effect, which leads to even
tighter credit conditions, the response of the effective interest rate and hence credit
spread is magnified. Larger credit spread causes inefficient use of inputs in the
production process. Thus, output declines more. Due to larger fluctuations in the
output and the effective interest rate, robust central bank guards herself against
model misspecification stemming from the financial side of the economy by initially
dampening the policy rate. Hence, model ambiguity in the financial side requires a
passive monetary policy stance. Moreover, the response of interest rate lasts longer
compared to the rational expectations solution due to the endogenous persistence of
the shock.
In order to observe the impact of financial uncertainty on the conduct of monetary
policy, we further analyze the policy function of the interest rate. Table 1 shows the
coefficient of the financial shock in the policy function of the interest rate which
suggest 93% less responsiveness to the financial shock under financial uncertainty.
An analysis of the impact of additional tools is inevitable in a framework when the
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Table 1: Policy function for the instruments
(a) Financial Uncertainty: Coefficient on νλ
Rt-Rational Expectations 0.0067
Rt-Worst Case -0.0005
Change 93%
policymaker is accountable for multiple mandates. The related literature is pioneered
by Tinbergen (1952) suggesting that for a policy to be successful, the number of
available policy tools should be enough to address multiple inefficiencies faced by the
central banks. In a recent work by Davig and Gu¨rkaynak (2015), a similar question
is reexamined under welfare based optimal monetary policy framework.
We are also interested in the dynamics when the policymaker has an access to
a second tool, namely the macroprudential tool. In this model, credit subsidy is
used as the macroprudential policy tool. As De Paoli and Paustian (2017) discusses,
credit subsidy fully eliminates the financial distortions. We show that this result is
still preserved in the presence of financial uncertainty.
Proposition 1. In this model, since the credit subsidy, St, directly targets financial
frictions, there is no room for model uncertainty originating from financial side of the
economy in the presence of the macroprudential policy instrument. Counter-cyclical
credit subsidy immediately offsets the financial shock.
Proof. Solving the first-order conditions (11)-(17) and (20)-(21) under the fully
optimal commitment policy yields that Lagrange multiplier for the dynamic net
19
worth accumulation equation, s3t to be zero.
6 In this case, financial shock and hence
uncertainty associated with the shock is not transmitted into the real economy.
4.1.2. Inflation Uncertainty
In this section, we present the dynamics of the model under a mark-up shock.
Figure 2: One Tool: Responses to Markup Shock
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the model when the policymaker has access to
one instrument only. A positive mark-up shock leads to an increase in inflation and
6Optimal commitment policy requires to set the multipliers s1t−1− s5t−1 to zero since there are
no binding previous commitments in the first period.
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a fall in the output. The optimal path of interest rate initially falls on impact to
alleviate the negative response of output. However, current inflation also falls due
to the commitment to higher future interest rates.
With lower output level, working capital need of intermediate firms causes a fall
loan demand. At the same time, lower interest rate discourages saving behavior of
the households. Thus, bank deposits and loan supply falls. Since decrease in loan
supply dominates the fall in loan demand, the effective interest rate increases initially.
As the net worth of the financial intermediaries increase —due to the increase in
spread—loan supply recovers and effective rate falls below its steady state value.
Eventually, the impact of the shock dissipates.
Evidently, the conventional monetary policy is not enough to ameliorate the tena-
cious fluctuations in credit conditions, which calls for an additional tool for this
purpose. Below, we explore the impact of this tool on the financial stability.
Under inflation uncertainty, inflation and subsequently output fluctuates more.
Furthermore, the impact of the shock is more prolonged due to uncertainty. This
induces an aggressive response in the policy rate. Under commitment, central bank
stabilizes the economy not only by controlling the current output but also by promis-
ing to keep them lower in the future. Due to the stronger response of the policy rate,
the economy faces tighter credit conditions. By virtue of higher spread, the deterio-
ration in the financial stability is more severe.
As discussed earlier, Tinbergen principle suggests that one policy instrument can
only achieve one independent goal. Hence, when the central bank is equipped with
the interest rate as the policy tool, targeting financial stability would increase the
21
Figure 3: Two Tool: Responses to Markup Shock
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volatility of inflation and output. An additional tool designed to fight for financial
instability could help macroeconomic stability. Accordingly, Figure 3 shows the
dynamics of the model when the policymaker has access to both monetary and
macroprudential tools. Policymaker sets the interest rate and the macroprudential
policy instruments simultaneously in order to pursue the objective of maximizing
social welfare.
A positive mark-up shock leads to an increase in inflation and a fall in the output.
As in the one-tool case, the nominal interest rate decreases. However, the presence
of the macroprudential tool offsets the impact of the cost push shock on the financial
market. Unlike one-tool case, the deterioration in the supply of loan is dampened,
and decrease in loan demand results in lower effective interest rate.
After a cost-push shock, credit subsidy prevents effective interest rate to increase
unlike in the one-tool case. Therefore, cost channel has a negative impact on the
inflation. Similar to the one-tool case, inflation uncertainty deteriorates the financial
market conditions. Nevertheless, macroprudential instrument countervails the de-
crease in the loan supply by responding aggressively. Therefore, the transmission of
the credit distortions into the real economy is suppressed. However, interest response
is still aggressive since the source of uncertainty is in the inflation equation. This
discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Credit subsidy dampens the impact of the cost channel.
In order to evaluate the effect of inflation uncertainty on the policymaking, we
further analyze the policy function of the interest rate and the credit subsidy. Table
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Table 2: Policy function for the instruments
(a) Inflation Uncertainty (One Tool): Coefficient on νm
Rt-Rational Expectations -2.306
Rt-Worst Case -3.4
Change 47%
(b) Inflation Uncertainty (Two Tools): Coefficient on νm
Rt-Rational Expectations -1.12
Rt-Worst Case -1.5
Change 33.9%
St-Rational Expectations 11.13
St-Worst Case 11.7
Change 5%
2 summarizes the coefficient of the inflation shock in the policy functions of available
policy tools. First, under certainty the principle of Tinbergen still exists. Next,
uncertainty leads the interest rate to be more aggressive in both one-tool and two-
tools cases. In the former, the responsiveness of the interest rate becomes 47% more
aggressive under uncertainty. The corresponding value for the latter case is 33.9%.
At the same time, the credit subsidy responds more aggressively by 5%. Therefore,
the burden of uncertainty on the supply side of the economy is shared among available
policy tools.
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4.2. Discussion
In this model, α is the key parameter determining the importance of the cost
channel in the model. Put differently, it is the interest rate pass-through from finan-
cial sector to the real economy. We discuss the sensitivity of our results for different
levels of α under rational expectations as well as under uncertainty.
Table 3 (a) shows the coefficient of financial shock in the policy function of in-
terest rate for α = 0.2 and α = 0.8 both for rational expectations and for the case
under financial uncertainty.7 The fluctuations in the financial market are carried to
the real economy through the impact of the effective interest rate on inflation. Ac-
cordingly, as the weight of the cost channel increases, the response of the interest rate
becomes stronger under rational expectations. Furthermore, due to the uncertainty
in the financial side of the economy, the decrease in the loan supply is stronger. As a
response, there is an upward pressure on interest rate to countervail the negative im-
pact on loan supply by attracting deposits to fulfill the loan demanded by the firms.
To sum up, the impact of uncertainty on the economy decreases as the strength of
the cost channel increases.
Proposition 3. As the importance of the cost channel increases, the impact of fi-
nancial uncertainty decreases. Robust monetary becomes less passive (passiveness
decreases).
Table 3 (b) and 3 (c) illustrate the initial responses of policy tool(s) to inflation
7For consistency with the rest of the analysis, we choose α = 0.2 and α = 0.8 so that the relative
weights of the targets in the social welfare function stay the same.
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Table 3: Policy function for the instruments
(a) Financial Uncertainty: Coefficient on ελ
Importance of financial frictions (α) 0.2 0.8
Rt-Rational Expectations 0.000727 0.0189
Rt-Worst Case -0.0041 0.0171
Change 664% 10%
(b) Inflation Uncertainty (One Tool): Coefficient on εm
Importance of financial frictions (α) 0.2 0.8
Rt-Rational Expectations -2.36 -1.73
Rt-Worst Case -2.99 -2.66
Change 27% 54%
(c) Inflation Uncertainty (Two Tools): Coefficient on εm
Importance of financial frictions (α) 0.2 0.8
Rt-Rational Expectations -1.79 -0.36
Rt-Worst Case -2.2 -0.49
Change 23% 36%
St-Rational Expectations 8.02 16.73
St-Worst Case 8.33 17.17
Change 3.9% 2.6%
Note. To keep the detection error probability constant, we recalibrate Θ for each case.
shock for different values of α for the cases under rational expectations and inflation
uncertainty. As the pass-through effect on inflation becomes more significant, fluc-
tuations in the financial sector vehemently carried to the real economy, and leading
to stronger response of inflation in return. Due to the cost-push shock, there is a
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downward pressure on interest rate to eliminate the negative impact of the shock on
output. However, the fall in interest rate is suppressed by the increase in inflation.
Under uncertainty, the response of the interest rate is more aggressive. Moreover,
the impact of the uncertainty escalates as the importance of cost channel increases
due to the fact that the uncertainty on the supply side of the economy triggers the
fluctuations in the financial side; thus, we observe further inflation. Therefore, the
interest rate decreases even more.
As the weight of cost channel in the Phillips equation increases, the response of
robust policy becomes more aggressive which contradicts with the result of Tillmann
(2009). In Tillmann (2009) spread is exogenous; however, in our framework the ef-
fective interest rate, hence spread, is determined in the loan market. The presence of
the endogenous spread leads to an increase in the effective interest rate after a cost-
push shock and contemporaneously effects the inflation rate. Therefore, the response
of inflation becomes higher as the importance of cost channel increases. When the
central bank has access to the macroprudential tool, responses of interest rate under
rational expectation and uncertainty are identical to one-tool case: aggressiveness of
the interest rate tool declines and the impact of uncertainty on interest rate rises. As
the transitivity of financial sector on real economy strengthens, the macroprudential
tool becomes more aggressive to control the fluctuations in the financial sector under
rational expectations. However, the impact of uncertainty on the macroprudential
tool is less observed because the considerable amount of uncertainty is treated by
the interest rate. Therefore the role of credit subsidy to cope with uncertainty is
limited.
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Proposition 4. As the importance of the cost channel increases, the impact of infla-
tion uncertainty increases. Robust monetary becomes more aggressive (aggressiveness
increases). Robust macroprudential policy becomes less aggressive (aggressiveness de-
creases).
Our analysis indicates that the source of uncertainty matters and it has an imper-
ative impact on the conduct of monetary policy. In our model, financial uncertainty
originates from a shock to the loan market which highlights the severity of the moral
hazard problem in the financial market. This type of uncertainty brings attenuation
in monetary policy. Clearly, in a model where the source of financial uncertainty
is related to the volatility of asset prices as in Kantur and O¨zcan (2018), optimal
policy suggestion would be substantially different as discussed above. Policymakers
should take these concerns into consideration in pursue of robust policies. Moreover,
in this paper the responsibility of stabilization of inflation and output, and providing
stable financial system is assumed by a single institution. It will be an interesting fu-
ture area for research to explore the impact of strategic interaction between multiple
robust policymakers especially when monetary and the macroprudential authorities
have coordination failures.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose robust optimal policy under uncertainty in response
to financial and inflation shocks by acknowledging financial stability as an explicit
objective of monetary policy in addition to inflation and output targets. To do so,
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we extend the framework of De Paoli and Paustian (2017) by incorporating model
uncertainty in the spirit of Hansen and Sargent (2008). Our findings are as follows:
If the model misspecification originates from the financial side of the economy, the
policymaker should prefer to choose a passive monetary policy stance. However,
an uncertainty associated with the supply side of the economy requires an aggres-
sive reaction of the policymaker. We also assess the contribution of an additional
—macroprudential—tool to the dynamics of the economy. Since macroprudential
tool directly targets the inefficiencies in the financial market related variables, the
uncertainty in the financial side of the economy is not transmitted to the real econ-
omy. On the other hand, an uncertainty which has a direct impact on the supply
side of the economy requires more aggressive policy stance for both conventional
and macroprudential tool. In two-tool environment, compared to one-tool case, the
burden of uncertainty is shared among available policy instruments.
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6. Appendix
Households
The optimality conditions for labor supply, capital utilization, and riskless-bond holdings are as
follows:
Lθt
c−σt
= Ωwwt (22)
uθt
c−σt
= Ωrrt (23)
c−σt = βEt
(
c−σt+1
Rt
πt+1
)
(24)
Firms
The first order conditions are:
αptxt = (1 + φt)RtwtLt (25)
(1− α)ptxt = rtut (26)
where φt refers to the spread between borrowing and the deposit rate. Especially, φt−1 = (R
B
t−1 −
Rt−1)/Rt−1.
In equilibrium, the price-setting problem of Rotemberg yields the following Phillips equation:
0 = (1− ǫt) + ǫtpt − ϕ(πt−1)πt − βEt
[
c−σt+1
c−σt
ϕ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1
yt+1
yt
]
(27)
Due to monopolistic competition, firms can earn profits in equilibrium. Dividends are distributed
to shareholders of the final good firms.
dt = yt(1− pt)−
ϕ
2
(πt − 1)
2yt (28)
In symmetric equilibrium, where yi,t = yt, aggregate output is given by
yt = L
α
t u
1−α
t . (29)
Total output equals to the summation of consumption and price adjustment costs. Market clearing
condition:
yt = ct +
ϕ
2
(πt − 1)
2yt (30)
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